Morzuch et al.; Bailey and Womack; de Gorter and This paper presents findings from an analytical Paddock; Lee and Helmberger; McIntosh and scheme that offers a promising alternative to tradiShideed). In the development of policy variables, the tional procedures of modeling acreage response. The basic methodology adopted by most studies is the scheme addresses the two-step decision process in one developed by Houck and Subotnik, who colwhich program and nonprogram planting decisions lapsed the price support rate with the program acreare modeled separately, conditional on the decision age restriction requirements into one composite to participate. This provides a more realistic and explanatory variable called "effective support intuitive portrayal of producers' decision making price." Even though Gallagher retains the basic process. The model is applied at the regional level Houck-Subotnik formulation, he notes that this to assess the impact of farm programs on acreage specification does not allow for producers' reresponse for corn in the Corbelt and Lake States, sponses to market prices. By assuming weak and and for wheat in the Northern Plains. The impacts of strong market conditions, Gallagher developed a policy variable changes on participation and planted composite expected producer incentive price variacreage are also analyzed.
It is higher than the support price when market Structural changes in agriculture have often reconditions are strong. The weakness of Gallagher's flected the impact of farm programs that influence formulation is that the expected producer incentive acreage of both controlled and uncontrolled comprice will always remain above support price, exmodities as well as the location of production. As a cept when target and lagged farm prices are equal. result, integration of farm programs in supply reThis discrepancy is very important to recognize, sponse models has received considerable attention especially in recent years when market prices have in recent years. The most important tools that the consistently remained below support level. In addigovernment has employed to steer the direction of tion, this method results in nonlinear relationships agricultural production have been nonrecourse among observable variables, creating estimation loans, direct payments, deficiency payments, acreproblems. age allotments, and land retirement programs. The
Other approaches dealing with farm programs in .success of land retirement programs requires that supplyresponseanalysis includeoneby Morzuch et producers be compensated for foregone production al., who disaggregated the time series into years in order to elicit participation. A farmer considering with similar programs and then performed separate the participation decision must weigh programbeneregressions. Lee and Helmberger also divided the fits resulting from nonrecourse loans and deficiency period 1948-1980 into a 'farm program regime' and payments against program costs resulting from seta 'free market regime' and performed separate reaside requirements. Given the operational complexgressions. The problem with this procedure is that ity of commodity programs, the participation it is expensive in terms of degrees of freedom. decision requires careful individual analysis.
Rausser and Just also point out that given that some Much literature exists that has examined the impolicy instruments are used for a very short period pact of farm programs on the supply of agricultural of time, the information gained through historical products (Houck and Subotnik; Houck and Ryan; observations of their impact may be limited. Lidman and Bawden; Garst and Miller; Gallagher; Duncan M. Chembezi is a Postdoctoral Researcher and Abner W. Womack is a Professor in the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Missouri-Columbia. The authors whsh to acknowledge the constructive comments and suggestions of three anonymous SJAE reviewers.
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Recent developments in supply response analysis model's aptness for policy analysis. The policy suggest that much of the work in previous studies changes evaluated are a 10 percent decrease in tarhas failed to develop a consistent analytical frameget price; introduction of a 10 percent paid land work that distinguishes the factors affecting producdiversion at $1.10 per bushel; and introduction of a ers' decisions to participate from the factors affecting 25 percent voluntary land diversion at $2.00 per their planting decisions. Participants' and nonparbushel. The effects of changes in farmers' price ticipants' planting decisions have been modeled in a expectations were also investigated. The two diversingle equation. In the presence of farm programs, sion options were chosen because such provisions this approach is less preferred because it fails to did not exist in 1989. The evaluation of a reduction recognize the two-step decision making process by in target price and of an increase in expected market producers and imposes questionable restrictions on price was motivated by the fact that the program the effects of policy variable changes on aggregate provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill provide a greater plantings (de Gorter and Paddock) . For instance, the latitude for free market production than did the proeffective support price approach by Houck The starting point is a single profit maximizing sion to participate in the program, as measured by farmer faced with the joint decisions of whether or the amount of acreage enrolled in the program, is not to participate in the program and the level of estimated independently from the planting decisions production. A farmer considering the participation within and outside the program. Thus, program and decision evaluates the expected profit functions innonprogram planting decisions are estimated sepaside and outside the program, and chooses to prorately, conditional on the decision to participate. duce under conditions with the highest profit value. The objective of this paper is to provide empirical The participating farmer is assumed to maximize estimates from the analytical procedure proposed by expected profit np in equation (1) subject to conSubotnik. This procedure was applied at the regional straints in equations (2) and (3). In equation (2) The assumption that only voluntary diversion is able land. As it becomes more lucrative to be paid constraining implies that X = 0, 3Ab = Av, (Ab(l-0l-for idling more acreage, less is planted to the pro- provision benefits crop producers in years when the The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufrisk of negative marketreturns fromcrop production ficient for optimal solutions. is perceived to be substantial (Thompson, Knight (5) = Y -L MC(AP < and Boren). As marginal revenue increases and exAp ceeds marginal costs, Ap > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the (L point more clearly. For ease of exposition only, it is A(6) PAY --0, assumed there are no costs associated with diver-\L sion. The relevant segment of operation on the (7) -= Ab(l --0 2 )--A p > 0, kinked budget line, 0 3 AbBAb(1-0l-0 2 ), given the voluntary diversion constraint, is 03AbB. At any point along this segment, 03Ab acres are diverted and the Under the 1990 Farm Bill, competing crops are permitted under the triple base option (on normal and optional flex acreage). Also in the early 1970s some competition between crops was permitted providing the farmer idled an amount of land corresponding to the plantings and set-aside rate of each chosen crop.
planting decision is based on the principle that 'mardiversion constraint. The planting decision is based ginal cost equals marginal revenue'. Some slack of on the principle of marginal cost (MC) equals maracres may remain. At point B, 03Ab and (1-01-02-ginal revenue (MR). At any price, Pi < Pp < P 2 , the 03)Ab acres are diverted and planted, respectively. farmer continues to idle 03Ab and plants (1-01-02-This also is the optimal point when both constraints 03)Ab. Pp and Pv have no effect on a participant's are binding. At this point, an increase in either Pv or acreage decisions because both constraints are now Pp will have no effect on participants' acreage allobinding. cation decisions because there are no more acres to As price exceeds P 2 and approaches P 3 , only the draw upon. However, the increase in these incentives acreage constraint is binding. The level of producmay attract additional farmers into the program.
tion is determined according to MC=MR. The marAssuming that only the acreage constraint (miniginal revenue in this price segment is the difference mum required diversion and set-aside or ARP) is between program price and voluntary diversion paybinding, then v = 0, Av = (Ab(1-01-02)-Ap)<03Ab and ment. In the price range P 3 < Pp < P 4 , price, once (Pp -Pv) = MC(Ap,Pi)>0. The optimal solution is again, is rendered impotent as acreage becomes a determined by equating the difference between the constraint. All the permitted acreage ((1-0!-02)Ab) is program production inducing price and voluntary planted, and none is placed under voluntary diverdiversion payments per bushel to marginal costs. n Voluntary diversion acreage has no unique solution and is obtained as a residual because the voluntary
The case of neither constraint binding exists in the diversion option is not binding. Changes in Pp and Pv price range P 4 Pp < P 5 , although the farmer must will have the same but opposite sign effects on Ap.
still abide by his available base allocation. As long As voluntary diversion payments increase, program as not all the base is exhausted, planted acreage is planted acreage declines by the same amount that determined according to the MC=MR principle. As diverted acreage is increased. In terms of Figure 1 , price exceeds P, the entire base is planted and no the optimal level of operation will lie along the acres are diverted under any diversion option. Once budget line Ab(1-01-02)BAb(1-01-02). When there is again, price ceases to have any impact on the no more diverted acreage to draw upon, we have a farmer's acreage allocation decisions as long as he corer solution. Program planted acreage will be remains aprogramparticipant. The curve connecting equal to the maximum that can be planted (permitted points PoVWXYZ may be thought of as a locus of acreage) after minimum requirements for program points tracing the supply function for program benefits are met, (1-01-02)Ab, on the horizontal axis.
planted a The assumption that neither constraint is binding Modeling of nonprogram acreage response is results in a solution similar to equation (10a), but straight-forward given that nonparticipants are not acreage diverted is obtained as a residual. However, constraied by program requirements. The farmer as incentives become more lucrative, the farmer's has a lot of flexibility regarding the use of his availwill to expand production will be limited by the able land This implies that a rational producer will continue to expand production until the marginal available base acreage. When the entire base is excontue to expand production until the marginal hausted, an increase in price will have no effect on cost of a partcularcrop is equal to its marginal the farmer's planting decision as long as he remains revenue. a program participant. Program planted acreage will Defining n*p and n*m as the expected indirect profit be equal to base acreage, and no acreage will be functions associated with program participation and diverted.
lack of it, respectively, then a farmer will join the The derivation of response functions in equations program if n*p 2 n*m and will remain outside the (9) to (12) may also be understood intuitively with program if n*p < n*m. The factors affecting the two the help of Figure 2 which indicates the level of profit functions will also affect the decision to parprogram planted acreage at every level of program ticipate. The effects of the arguments in the participroduction inducing price. At any price Pp < Po, the pation decision function will depend upon their maximum amount of acreage permitted under the effects on participants' and nonparticipants' profit voluntary diversion option is diverted, but no profunctions. This analysis assumes the farmer is riskduction takes place because the price is less than neutral, or alternatively, that the two technologies marginal cost. As alluded to earlier, the farmer may embody the same degree of risk. Consideration of enroll in the 0/92 reduced planting provision to risk attitudes and other factors like the need to build protect his base. In the price interval P 0 < Pp < P 1 , a crop base on farms with little or no base could the farmer diverts 03Ab in response to the voluntary change the participation decision. 190
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
fined. No intercept was allowed for in equations (13) ..~. ~. .~ . . .
and (14) for years in which neither constraint was Empirical specification of the estimating equations nd r ea n whih neither onstraint a binding. The reason was that during those years, descends directly from the discussion presented in tol e enroe the program was assued the preceding section. Acreage enrolled in the proto a acreage which was also eual gram (Aq) was used as a proxy for the participation acreage planted acreage planted in the program. decision, and was estimated as a function of program production inducing price, own market price, prices DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS of competing crops, diversion payments, and base acreage. The competing crops were soybeans and
The model was estimated using annual data for 24 wheat for corn in the Combelt and Lake States, and years, 1966 to 1989 . The data were obtained from corn and sorghum for wheat in the Northern Plains. fact sheets and publications by the USDA. Program The planting decision within the program was devariables and other related variables on a state-bypendent on the program production-inducing price, state basis were obtained from various statistical payments for voluntary diversion, and the planting summary publications for wheat and feed grains. constraints discussed in the preceding section. Non-
The market prices used in the analysis were the program acreage response (Am) was estimated as a regional market-year average prices received. The function of own market price and prices of competregional averages were developed by using share of ing crops. Both participants' and nonparticipants' regional production to weight state average prices. planting decisions were estimated conditional on the The diversion payment variable (Pd) was defined as decision to participate (Aq). The information for dea nonlinear function of payments on minimum reciding whether or not to participate is embedded in quired diversion and voluntary diversion payments Aq. Thus, conditions that induce some farmers to (Chembezi; Chembezi and Womack; Subotnik) . participate influence others not to participate.
Producers were assumed to have naive price expectations. Under these conditions, expected market To account for the different policy regimes de-. Under these conditions, expected market price for participants was the higher of the lagged picted in Figure 2 , a method had to be devised with price r participants as t ir o t a the help of dummy variables (5, S2, S3, and S4) farm price and the loan rate. For nonparticipants, it the help of dummy variables (S1, S2, S3, and S4) '~ '~ dwas merely lagged farm price. Even though the without excessive loss of degrees of freedom. The assumption of naive expectations may be a little assumption of naive expectations may be a little introduction of dummy variables facilitated the estirealistic previousresearchdidnotreachconsenunrealistic, previous research did not reach a consenmation of acreage response functions in equations sus as to the most plausible form of price expecta-(9) to (12) as a single equation. The outcome is much t eform of erie tions to use. Even the performance of alternative the same as that in a switching regression model. the me as hat in a swii eessi de forms of price expectations in previous studies proThe model was specified as follows: The model was specified as follows:
vided conflicting evidence (Shideed and White; The basic assumption underpinning the method of where S is zero if neither constraint is binding and l least squares, however, is one of spherical error one otherwise, S2 is the opposite of S1, S3 is zero if I i the terms. It involves the double assumption that the neither or only the acreage constraint is binding and error variance is constant at each observation point one otherwise, S4 is one if both constraints are and that the error covariances at all possible pairs of binding and zero otherwise, ai, Pi and Yi are the observation points are zero (Johnston) . The assumpparameters to be estimated, Rt = (01+02+03) is the tion of constant or homogeneous variance is likely sum of minimum required set-aside (or ARP), diverto have been violated in this analysis, especially for sion and voluntary diversion rates, and ei is the error years when both constraints (equations (2) and (3)) term. All the other variables are as previously deare said to be binding. In these years, the error term is zero because acreage planted in the program is tory power. The parameter estimates are all signifisimply total base minus idled acreage. To account for cant at the 10 percent level or better. The Durbinthe possibility of such a violation, the generalized Watson statistics reveal no sign of first order serial least squares (GLS) estimator was applied in the correlation. estimation of the model. The GLS estimator proAs expected, farm programs showed strong influvides estimates which are asymptotically more effience on plantings within and outside the program. cient than ordinary least squares by using the For nonparticipants, there must be a one-to-one corinformation contained in the covariance matrix to respondence between program and nonprogram improve the estimates. The parameter estimates are
acreage. An acre enrolled in the program must represented in Table 1 . The values in parentheses are fleet a one-acre decrease in nonprogram acreage. the asymptotic t-statistics. Root-mean square error
The parameter estimates with respect to program (RMSE), Durbin-Watson, and adjusted R-square acreage were -0.946 for corn and -0.411 for wheat. statistics are also provided for each equation. The
The estimate for corn was in the neighborhood of the estimates indicate that the model has good explanaideal estimate of -1.0. However, the estimate for 192 wheat showed a substantial amount of slippage presubstitution among the outputs. Secondly, it causes sent because an acre enrolled in the program reduced changes in the decision to participate along a new nonprogram plantings by only about 0.411 acres. expansion path associated with output prices, which One of the reasons the substitution may not be acreyield the subsequent changes in the level of plantfor-acre is that nonparticipants may choose to plant ings. other crops or to idle land that cannot be used to grow ( AA A the program crop profitably at the market price.
( price and market price, respectively. All the estiwere 0.806 and 0.634, respectively. These estimates mates are presented in Table 2 . Nonprogram acreage suggest that for every acre enrolled in the program, elasticities were generally larger than those of proonly about 81 percent for corn and 63 percent for gram planted acreage, reflecting the restrictions prowheat was planted because about 19 percent and 37 gram provisions impose onplanting decisions within percent, respectively, of the same unit acre was idled the program. This is also explained in terms of to meet the various land retirement programs. These substitution between program and nonprogram acrerates compare well with those actually observed age given a change in market or program price. over the historical period. Equations 1.2 and 1.5 in Thus, for every acre enrolled in the program, less Table 1 also support the assertion that in those years than an acre was planted. The elasticity of nonproin which both constraints were binding, program gram acreage for corn with respect to price of soyplanted acreage may be approximated merely by beans was positive because the expansion effects due base acreage less set-aside and/or diversion requireto increased program participation dominated the ments ((l-Rt)Aq). The estimates with respect to (1-direct price effects. This result seems counter-intuiRt)Aq, a proxy for maximum permitted plantings, tive at first. However, it must be realized that as the were 0.998 for corn and 0.995 for wheat. In equaprice of soybeans increased, the relative profits of tions 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 1.5 of Table 1, the estimates being in and out of the program were both reduced. with respect to base acreage were all equal to unity, The relative profits affected the most will affect the as expected, supporting the contention that for years numerical outcome. These results suggest that proin which acreage reduction programs were nonexgram profits are affected the most, causing the profits istent, program planted acreage was equal to total obtained outside the program to be relatively higher. acreage enrolled in the program which was also In his national model for corn, Subotnik observed a equal to base acreage. similar relationship between nonprogram acreage for corn and soybean price.
Elasticity Estimates
The program production-inducing price elasticity The estimates presented here are total elasticities of program planted acreage was larger than that of reflecting the direct price effects and also indirect or total program acreage for both crops. This is due to expansion effects from increased participation.
the fact that the former reflects the effects of two Equations (16) and (17) show how elasticity estifactors, each of which had a positive influence. First, mates for program and nonprogram acreage with there were the direct effects of the production-inrespect to program and expected market prices, reducing price. Second, there were the indirect effects spectively, were derived; and provide an indication of increased program participation. Both of these of how the rest of the estimates were calculated. The factors affect program planted acreage positively. total effect on program (nonprogram) acreage of a
The elasticity of total program acreage, on the other change in program production-inducing (expected hand, reflected only the positive effects of the promarket) price for corn is split into two effects. A gram production-inducing price. direct or substitution effect represented by the first The elasticity of total planted acreage with respect term in the square bracket, and an expansion effect to program production-inducing price was negative shown by the second term. In other words, a change for corn and positive for wheat, suggesting that in the program (market) price for corn induces a policy instruments have been effective for corn but change in output price ratios which entails technical ineffective for wheat in reducing plantings. These 193 The estimate with respect to program production-inmagnitude of the net effect depend on the size of the ducing price of 0.101 is difficult to evaluate but is elasticities, relative shares of program and nonproconsistent with the value of 0.073 by Chembezi and gram planted acreage, and on the size of the acreage Womack. It is cautioned, however, that some of the reduction program.
estimates from previous studies are national rather The elasticity of total planted acreage with respect than regional averages. to voluntary diversion payments for both crops was negative, as expected, suggesting that these payPolicy Variable Simulations ments have been effective in reducing corn and
The impacts of three policy changes on planted wheat plantings over the years. Voluntary diversion acreage for corn and wheat were analyzed to deterpayments affect both program and nonprogram mine the performance and appropriateness of the planted acreage negatively, implying that these paymodel for policy analysis (Table 3) . Scenario A ments have a depressing effect on plantings.
shows that a 10 percent decrease in 1989 target price Even though the method employed in calculating reduced total corn and wheat plantings by about 0.31 these elasticity estimates is different from that of and 2.16 percent, respectively. The increase in nonmost studies, some comparison with previous studprogram acreage failed to compensate for the deies could still be made with some caution. The corn crease in program planted acreage. Program acreage, market price elasticity of total planted acreage and hence program planted acreage, decreased for (0.156) compares favorably with 0.419 to 0.188 by both crops as production within the program became Chembezi and Womack, 0.112 and 0.185 by Galless lucrative and therefore less able to induce inlagher, 0.130 by Houck and Ryan, 0.137 by creased participation. These impact changes comShideed, et al., and 0.109 to 0.199 by Shideed and pare favorably with elasticity estimates with respect White. The value is, however, smaller than 0.330 to program price (evaluated at 1989 values) which and 0.434 by Subotnik, 0.240 by de Gorter and showed that a 10 percent increase in program price Paddock, and 0.249 by Lee and Helmberger. The increases corn and wheat plantings by 0.29 percent elasticity with respect to program production-inand 2.42 percent, respectively. 194 Note that while the impact of a decrease in target reduction in program plantings, hence the reduction price in 1989 for corn was a reduction in total plantin total plantings for corn. The central issue in this ings (Table 3) , the elasticity of total planted acreage analysis is that when offsetting effects of program with respect to program production-inducing price and nonprogra lanted acreage are taken into ac-(evaluated at the mean) in Table 2 suggests that an (evaluatedatthemean)Tablesuggests thatan count, the direction of change in aggregate plantings increase in program production-inducing price re-. . ncrease n programprodctionncngpcee associated with a change in a policy variable such as duces total plantings also. At first, these results seem target price is indeterminate (de Gorter and Padcontradictory. However, the results simply suggest te e rter and a that while the target price option has been effective, dock introductn of a 10 percent paid land on average, in reducing plantings over the years, the diversio in 1989 at $1.10 per bushel resulted ina option was not effective in 1989. Because most of decrease in total plantings for both crops (Scenario theproductioninthe 1980s tookplaceinthe program B. n s d an ra in bh parin which target price (deficiency payment) was the ticipation and program plantings. This increase, supply-inducing price, it is expected that a decrease however, was not enough to undo the decrease in in deficiency payments should lead to a reduction in nonprogram acreage, causing total planted acreage program plantings due to a decrease in program for corn to decline by about 4.35 percent. Wheat participation. Even though this phenomenon, simulshowed an increase in participation but a decrease in taneously, leads to an increase in nonprogram proboth nonprogram and program planted acreage as duction, the results suggest that the increase in more land was diverted, leading to a 3.92 percent nonprogram plantings was not sufficient to offset the decline in wheat plantings. 195
The last policy scenario was the introduction of a grams have generally been successful in reducing 25 percent additional voluntary diversion in 1989 at corn and wheat plantings over the years. This con-$2.00 per bushel. Both corn and wheat models (Sceclusion is suported by the fact that a 10 percent nario C) showed a decline in total planted acreage.
increase in target price (deficiency payment rate) and Program participation went up substantially by diversion payments (payments on minimum diverabout 9.32 percent for corn and 7.10 percent for sion and voluntary diversion payments) reduced wheat. Because more acreage was placed under volcrop plantings by about 1.50 percent for corn and untary diversion, program planted acreage shrank. 0.26 percent for wheat. Plantings outside the program also decreased as proSecond, the question of offsetting effects of program provisions became more lucrative, leading to a gram and nonprogram acreage has been explored. decrease in total production of about 7.75 percent for Evaluatedatthemean,theeconometric results(Tacorn and 5.02 percent for wheat.
ble 2) indicate that deficiency payments (or target The impact of a change in producers'ice expecprice), as reflected by the program production-intations was also examined. The results (Scenario D) ducing price, have been effective for corn but inefwere consistent with intuition and prior expectafective for wheat in reducing aggregate plantings. tions. An increase in expected market price rendered
The results of impact evaluations in Table 3 (Sceprogram activities less attractive, causing both pronario A) suggest that target price in 1989 for both gram participation and program plantings to decline crops was ineffective since a decrease (increase) in while nonprogram and total production increased as target price reduced (increased) total production. the decrease in program plantings was overwhelmed These results are less surprising bearing in mind that by the increase in nonprogram planted acreage.
over three-fourths of corn and wheat production in IMPLICATIONS AND recent years has taken place within the program. On CONCLUDING REMARKS average, 62 percent of corn plantings in the Combelt and Lake States and 80 percent of wheat in the This study has presented findings from a scheme Northern Plains was in the program over the sample which offers significant results and valuable insights period (Table 2 ). In 1989 the share for corn rose to on producers' acreage response behavior. The about 78 percent while that of wheat dropped scheme is an improvement over traditional apslightly to about 76 percent. Given these figures and proaches that model program and nonprogram plantalso the fact that target price is the supply-inducing ing decisions in a single equation. The traditional price in the program, it makes sense to see positive approaches are less preferred to a procedure in which effects of target price on program plantings overprogram and nonprogram planted acres are modeled whelm its negative effects on nonprogram plantings, conditional on the decision to participate. The apresulting in i increase in total plantings. The impliproach used in this study provides a more realistic cation of this is that target price would seem to have and intuitive portrayal of producers' decision makbecome more a means of supporting farm incomes ing processes. The policy scenarios analyzed cast than of controlling supply. An effective way of some light on the aptness of the scheme for policy achieving both these goals concurrently, as has been analysis. the case over the years, would be through the impleThe results support the following conclusions. mentation of target price policy along with paid land First, policy variables play a major role in corn and diversion options. As alluded to earlier, our results wheat production decisions, reflecting the strong demonstrate that a proportionate increase in all polinfluence of government programs in the last three icy prices results in a decrease in plantings for both decades. The program production inducing price corn and wheat. adequately reflects the economic incentives for producers to join farm programs. Other policy options Third, estimation of program and nonprogram are also important in both program participation and planted acreage separately, conditional on the deciacreage allocation decisions. The parameter estision to participate, seems a useful construct in modmates with respect to diversion payments were negaeling program participation and planting decisions tive for the program planted acreage equations and in the presence of farm programs. This also helps to positive for total program acreage equations, sugidentify response differentials between program and gesting that diversion payments may be effective in nonprogram planted acreage to changes in market or lowering plantings and eliciting program participapolicy variables. The estimates in Table 2 suggest tion. This conclusion is also supported by the policy that nonprogram acreage is more responsive to evaluation results of the two diversion options in changes in price signals than is program planted Table 3. Our findings suggest that government proacreage, reflecting the restrictions and/or lack of 196 flexibility programs impose on participants' planting modate the provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill, these decisions.
are likely to be minor and will be modeled in the Fourth, this study has attempted to deal with farm same way the previous provisions over the historical programs in supply response for corn and wheat. The period have been handled. analysis is equally applicable to other program Finally, the analytical procedure in this paper crops. So far, the analysis has concentrated on preshould be useful in evaluating supply response bevious programs up to and including the 1985 Farm havior for time periods governed by multiple farm Bill. However, as we enter the 1990s, the real quesprograms. This should be more pertinent if the obtion centers around the effect of the 1990 Farm Bill jective, in addition to merely estimating elasticities, on the overall specification of this model. Clearly, includes a proper evaluation of the impacts of policy the 1990 Farm Bill exhibits some departure from variables on program participation and acreage alloprevious legislations. For instance, the new legislacation, as should be the case. Some suggestions for tion advocates a lower government support and future improvements, however, are in order. First, the freezes minimum target price on program crops at question of risk-aversion has been mentioned but not 1990 levels for five years. Even though the ARP of addressed exhaustively. Even though evidence of the the 1985 Farm Bill still exists, there are no paid land importance of risk (price and yield) in production diversion options (minimum required and voluntary decisions is overwhelming (Just; Ryan; Seale and diversion options). Instead, normal and optional Shonkwiler; Traill), its significance in the presence flexible acreage options are included. On this acreof government intervention is still in question. age, the farmer has freedom to make his own produc- Thompson et al. found risk attitudes to be important tion decisions without losing his crop acreage base.
in the presence of the 50/92 and/or 0/92 reduced The farmer, however, loses deficiency payments on planting options. Gallagher and Bailey and Womack flexible acreage. Will these elements have any effect found price risk to have little influence on supply on the specification? Given lack of data for the post response in the presence of farm programs. Seale 1990 era, it is very difficult to answer this question and Shonkwiler doubted the usefulness of risk conempirically. However, it seems clear that the technisideration in supply response for regulated crops. cal aspects just outlined will not present major anaDespite such divided evidence, the question of risk lytical problems to warrant a major overhaul of the aversion in the program participation decision is specification. Normal and optional flex acreage procrucial. A risk-averse farmer may still decide to join visions will be handled in exactly the same way the program even if it would be less profitable to do minimum and additional voluntary diversion options so. Finally, it is suggested that the analysis be exhave been handled in previous programs. In short, tended to the remaining corn and wheat producing while some adjustments will be required to accomregions.
